Taking Resilience Too Far

Resilience has never been more important in the discussion of U.S. national security policy. It?s also never been more overrated. In people, resilience is that inner ability to recover from setbacks?being down but not out, bouncing back, carrying on. But in countries, it also means something more: Accepting that some bad outcomes are inevitable and building in capacity to absorb the blows. By definition, resilience focuses more on recovery than prevention. And in national security, that's a big deal.

Resilience is fast becoming a silent cornerstone of American policy. These days, our goals are less about stopping bad things from happening and more about limiting the effects when they do happen?whether it?s creating computer networks that can resume operation after a cyber attack, developing homeland security programs to accelerate recovery after a terrorist strike, or helping new democracies withstand violent insurgencies. This month, the Army rolled out a new training program to prepare for what it sees as the wave of the future: ?indecisive conflicts.? Soldiers are now practicing how to support a host government against a witches? brew of insurgents, drug traffickers, terrorist networks, and other bad guys. Indecisive conflicts are all about resilience. Victory is inherently elusive. Bouncing back and persevering are the best that we can do.

It was not always this way. During the Cold War, resilience mattered, but not nearly so much. Because the Soviet enemy was clear, its destructive capabilities were well known, and the specter of nuclear war hung in the balance, our goal was preventing conflict, not recovering from it. The Cold War was a very dangerous time, but predictably so. The primary threat was always the same: Mutual assured destruction left little to the imagination. Sure, there were some nasty surprises. Kennedy never imagined Khrushchev would dare deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba. But the looming danger of nuclear annihilation had a way of focusing the mind on preventing war in the short run and defeating the Soviets in the long run. Other than ensuring a second strike nuclear capability, resilience was not a major part of Cold War security thinking. You don?t worry about ?bouncing back? when you think a single coordinated attack could destroy everything.

Source: http://feeds.slate.com/click.phdo?i=29eee3148a033add370d076912d54359

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